Optimism v. Hope: Larry Yackle, in Fairness by Soifer, Aviam
TRIBUTE
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Hope is definitely not the same thing as optimism. It is not the conviction
that something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes
sense, regardless of how it turns out.1
In his 1993 Commencement Speech at Wesleyan University, Cornel West
further emphasized the difference between hope and optimism. West described
how-having at that point been black in America for thirty-nine years-he could
not be an optimist because to be that required "sufficient evidence that would
allow us to infer that if we keep doing what we're doing, things will get better."
'2
By contrast, West called for "audacious hope.' 3
I also recently heard Bryan Stevenson-remarkable lawyer, law professor,
and author of the brilliant book, Just Mercy-make much the same point about
the need for hopefulness even as he dug deeply into last summer's troubling
events in Charlottesville. And I remember that the late Milner Ball-who was a
longtime friend to Larry and me, as well as to many others present for this talk,
and who was an eccentric and wise law professor as well as a practicing
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specifically thank two friends over many years: Pnina Lahav, who organized the memorable
event in honor of Larry Yackle, and Fran Miller, who hosted me. Also, the current students
who worked on this Essay for the Law Review, who were unusually gracious and helpful, as
was their faculty advisor Jim Fleming.
1 VACLAV HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE: A CONVERSATION WITH KAREL HVtD'ALA 181
(Paul Wilson trans., 1990).
2 Cornel West, Keynote Speaker, Commencement Address at Wesleyan University (May
30, 1993), http://www.humanity.org/voices/commencements/comel-west-wesleyan-speech-
1993 [https://perma.cc/LEW2-LQQA].
3 Id. West added, "William James said it so well in that grand and masterful essay of his
of 1879 called 'The Sentiment of Rationality,' where he talked about faith being the courage
to act when doubt is warranted. And that's what I'm talking about." Id.; see generally also
WILLIAM JAMES, The Sentiment of Rationality, in COLLECTED ESSAYS AND REvIEws 83
(1920); BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE (2006).
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Presbyterian minister-liked to point out that optimism tends to be overtaken by
facts, while hopefulness is what can keep one going anyway.
4
Decades ago, at the beginning of Reclaiming the Federal Courts, Professor
Larry W. Yackle proclaimed that: "We know, as the world is beginning to
understand, how fragile is our way of life and what dreadful chances we take
with it when we trifle with its basic institutions.
5
Nonetheless, Larry went on to declare:
The time is coming when the reins of power will come again to progressive
leaders. On that day, with the guidance of a willing chief executive and on
the strength of the legislative power of Congress, we will have reform
legislation to set right what has recently gone so terribly wrong.
6
This is a shining example of hope if ever there were one. Sadly, the hopeful goal
Larry articulated in 1994 seems even further away today. In other middle-range
prognostication, however, Larry has proved impressively prescient.7
Nonetheless, Larry continues to push the habeas corpus rock uphill. He does
so quietly, despite the fact that throughout the decades in which he has been
writing and advocating on behalf of prisoners, federal judges and Congress have
been creating more and more intricate barriers against issuing the Great Writ.
8
When our son Raphi was around two years old, Marlene and I delighted in seeing
' Milner also pointed out that no practicing Presbyterian could be an optimist in any event.
5 LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMTNG THE FEDERAL COURTs 3 (1994). He also noted "[t]he
time is coming when we Americans will have done with the ideological conservatism that
slipped into power when the mainstream liberal consensus collapsed in the mid-1970s." Id.
We wait.
6 Id.
7 In one of his early articles, Larry forecast:
It now seems clear that broadcasting will in time displace newspapers entirely and, in
turn, that broadcasting will be displaced by still more dramatic technological
achievements. Already cable systems pose a serious threat to broadcast interests. Before
very long, broadband programming, satellite communications unrestricted by the
horizon, and fiber optics will eclipse over-the-air broadcasting by local stations. Two-
way communications systems are already in use, promising to transform the making of
public policy as we know it.
Larry W. Yackle, Confessions of a Horizontalist: A Dialogue on the First Amendment,
27 U. KAN. L. REv. 541, 542 (1979).
Characteristically, Larry then sounded a theme that constitutes a significant thread
throughout his work: "Plainly, if these developments are left to be dealt with by Congress, the
enormously significant free speech consequences will be swallowed up by the political and
economic concerns of conglomerates that wish to fend off any technology they cannot
dominate." Id.
8 Larry's remarkable outpouring of brief writing as well as massive scholarship about
habeas corpus amounts to a kind of practical reverence. His article, The Habeas Hagioscope,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331 (1993), subtly illustrates this point. A hagioscope is the narrow
opening that affords those in the transcript a view of the altar.
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Larry and Jeanette often, and Raphi began to call Larry "Habeas Corpus."9 Raphi
had it right then, more than thirty years ago, and it is still accurate today: Larry
really is Mr. Habeas Corpus.
So what keeps Larry going? His prolific scholarship--eight books, not
counting supplements or teachers' manuals, and fifty articles-attest to his
tenacious focus. Yet how does Larry keep doing what many would call the
Lord's work on behalf of some of the most downtrodden among us? How can
he, paradoxically, remain preternaturally calm and keep fighting the good fight
exceptionally well, knowing all the while that he will keep losing time after
time--even though he is the genuine master at the federal courts chessboard?
Out of the myriad of possibilities, I will suggest three plausible factors.
First, I think we may find part of the answer within Larry's brief eulogy for
Allan Macurdy, our student, and later Larry's colleague, at Boston University.
Here is some of what Larry said: "I deeply respected Allan for thinking, and
writing, and caring about things that genuinely matter. He was an intellectual.
But he was not a bystander to the world at large. He wouldn't be, he couldn't be,
a bystander."10
Larry and I have talked of many things stretching even beyond the Red Sox,
but I doubt that we ever discussed Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel's work.
Nonetheless, Larry does not need any guidance, religious or otherwise, to act
steadily in pursuit of justice, perceiving that indifference to evil may be worse
than evil itself.1 Larry is constitutionally incapable, as it were, of being a
bystander-though in a moment I will begin quibbling with Larry about
constitutional capability in a different sense. Rather he is an outstanding example
of a lawyer who is consistently something rare: an upstander.
12
9 Appropriately, on the very day that we gathered to celebrate the somewhat shy but
definitely not retiring Professor Yackle, Raphi successfully defended his Ph.D. thesis at the
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Raphi's work focuses on the displacement of lower class
people and their memories by gentrification and government policy. He did all this in
Portuguese, and so we can further credit Jeanette's Peace Corps experience in Brazil and her
exemplary linguistic skills for helping to shape this young lad. Over many decades, Larry and
Jeanette also have run a warmly welcoming Home for Wayward Soifers and Booths-as
international as Jeanette's incomparable cherry pie.
10 Larry Yackle, Reflections on Allan Macurdy, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. vii, at viii (2009).
n Heschel proclaimed, for example, "morally speaking there is no limit to the concern one
must feel for the suffering of human beings." ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, The Reasons for
My Involvement in the Peace Movement, in MORAL GRANDEUR AND SPIRITUAL AUDACITY 224,
225 (Susannah Heschel ed., 1996). He also wrote "that indifference to evil is worse than evil
itself' and "that in regard to cruelties committed in the name ofa free society, some are guilty,
while all are responsible:" Id. at 224-25.
12 Martha Minow points out that "upstander" is increasingly accepted in the human rights
context, apparently coined in its modem usage by Samantha Power. See Lincoln Caplan, The
"Upstander," HARV. MAG. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://harvardmagazine.com/2017/02/harvard-
law-dean-martha-minow-assessed [https://perma.cc/K7CE-RDUS
2018]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
Larry is close to the vest generally, but another element of Larry's unflagging
commitment may be discoverable in Larry's brief but uncharacteristically
autobiographic description of how he began to represent federal prisoners at
Leavenworth while he was still a law student. He described his initial trepidation
and added: "Yet after frequent visits I became as hardened to the doors, the bars,
and the rest of the prison environment as the others who came that way-the
inmates, the families, the guards.
'13
Larry further acknowledged that few of the prisoners had any chance of
winning and he suggested that they knew that as well as he did.
I was frankly confounded, then, by [the prisoners'] incorruptible conviction
that if nobody else was still prepared to listen to their claims, the courts
remained open. And not just any courts, but the federal courts-the courts
ordained and established by Congress to exercise the federal judicial
power. Those federal convicts at Leavenworth, and equally the inmates at
the state penitentiary a few miles away, believed as they believed nothing
else that the federal courts were still listening.
14
Larry remains an astute critic of the work of the federal courts, pointing out that
"we should not confuse the familiar with the necessary."'5 Yet the story of Fay
v. Noia,16 for instance, "is also about even-handed treatment as a moral
imperative.
'17
Finally, Larry is a seeker after truth. His quest is a marathon event, fueled by
dry wit, clarity, and the willingness to concede opposing points. In matters large
and small, this is his steady approach. He writes with striking confidence, for
example, using his first-person narrative voice-and his dry sense of humor-
to great effect as he directly addresses readers.18 And one of his unusual writing
"3 YACKLE, supra note 5, at 212.
14 Id. at 212-13.
'5 Larry Yackle, The Story of Fay v. Noia: Another Case About Another Federalism, in
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 191, 192 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
16 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
17 Yackle, supra note 15, at 193. Sadly, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991),
overruled Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Noia was handed down the same day as Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Larry links the two decisions as important elements
of the Warren Court legacy. See Yackle, supra note 15, at 211.
18 There were early indicators of Larry's self-confidence, as well as his analytic skill. His
burst of scholarship within the first few years of his 1972 graduation from the University of
Kansas School of Law was remarkable. In Larry W. Yackle, Private Use of Public Facilities:
A Comment on Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 659 (1974), for
example, Larry took apart and then suggested how to improve and put back together the
tangled issue of state action doctrine in the context of private racial discrimination. He
concluded by informing the Supreme Court about its proper role:
Constitutional principles have ragged edges, and adjustments will always be necessary
in borderline cases. On the other hand, the Court cannot fail to decide issues that fairly
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quirks is to grant-and often thereby to defang-that there may be weighty
counterarguments. Thus many Yackle sentences are sprinkled through with "to
be sure" or "to be fair" or "in fairness" qualifiers. This is not only an effective
way to write; it also reflects the subtle strength of being an absolutely first-rate
lawyer.
And Attorney Yackle somehow, paradoxically, retains his deep faith in our
federal courts. In this Larry is anything but understated. Here, for example, are
his stirring words near the end of Reclaiming the Federal Courts:
The lesson I learned at Leavenworth is that federal courts are special. They
are the most splendid institutions for the maintenance of governmental
order and individual liberty that humankind has ever conceived. They
work, you see. And they ensure that the rest of the framework we call
constitutional democracy also works.19
This passionate belief helps to explain why Professor Yackle is so keyed up
when federal courts law makes no sense at all. In The Figure in the Carpet, for
example, Larry contrasted the many possible meanings of the carpet in the
famous Henry James short story with how extensively the Supreme Court-and
even more so Congress-have ripped up the Warren Court legacy, to the point
of creating "a bewildering morass that defies explanation at any deep conceptual
level. We can find no figure in this carpet."20 Indeed, Larry's writing stands out
for communicating complex ideas effectively, and for doing so in a down-to-
earth manner that manages to bring readers along clearly and, almost always,
convincingly as well.
Despite all the extreme examples of Byzantine twists and turns, Larry's
federal habeas corpus goal remains remarkably consistent, pithy, and direct:
"Federal habeas corpus law should be traceable to the baseline idea that
prisoners are generally entitled to litigate federal claims in federal court. '21 I
fully agree with Mr. Habeas Corpus on this essential point, and much more. But
long-lasting great friendship is also built on differences, including quibbles and
even disagreements. I have at least one of each to suggest.
My main quibble involves wondering how far Professor Yackle will go in
advancing his belief in the important work ofjudges. In Regulatory Rights, Larry
offers a severe critique of rights discourse generally and he swears off arguments
are presented by docketed cases. Legitimate disputes must be resolved for the sake of
litigants, present and future. The system depends for guidance upon principled decisions
that are both certain and flexible enough to stand the test of time. This is the essential
function of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 690.
" YACKLE, supra note 5, at 213.
20 78 TEX. L. REv. 1731, 1731 (2000). Indeed, "[t]his is an intellectual disaster
area.... But state judgments are worth protecting only if they meet a sufficient standard of
acceptability-not, I should think, if they are close enough for government work." Id. at 1756.
21 Id. at 1769.
2018]
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grounded in constitutional text or original intent.22 I was honored to provide a
blurb on the back cover of Regulatory Rights-a lot of good that did for sales-
and I continue to think that Larry produced "the kind of book that comes along
once or twice in a generation, as in the works of Alexander Bickel, Charles
Black, and John Hart Ely. '23 But, in the memorable words of Alan Feld during
our long-running, low-stakes Boston poker game-generously hosted by Larry
and Jeanette more often than their fair share-I now want to add: "Not so fast."
I look forward to many more years to badger Larry about how much, within
constitutional law, one ought to embrace somewhat more than his clean sweep
of text and history. He summarizes his argument as follows: "I mean to argue
that substantive federal constitutional rights draw their meaning exclusively
from the great body of relevant Supreme Court decisions.'24 The central theme
of Regulating Rights is the essential, exclusive role of what Larry terms the
"rational instrumentalism" of judges; indeed, he asserts that, in giving content
to substantive individuals rights, "[n]othing else matters.'25 I counter, however,
that the text of the Constitution indeed has been very much abused,26 yet that
text still matters. In fact, its very abuse over the centuries underscores the text's
unfulfilled promise.
This is not an argument, to be sure, that we are bound by the text. Indeed, my
claim about both text and its historical context is that while "the past has a
vote.. ., it does not have a veto. '27 This should be particularly important if one
were actually to attend to the unfulfilled hope within the text of the
Reconstruction Amendments, and the statutes based upon them. And I believe
22 See generally LARRY YACKLE, REGULATORY RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT AcTIvisM, THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE MAKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2007).
23 Id. (dust jacket).
24 Id. at 1-2.
25 Id. at 2.
26 There is no credible way, for example, to find that Justice Scalia's beloved Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated and applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment quoted other parts
of the Fifth Amendment haec verba, and the omission of the Takings Clause language was
hardly a slip of the pen. See generally Aviam Soifer, Text-Mess: There is No Textual Basis
for Application of the Takings Clause to the States, 28 U. HAW. L. REv. 373 (2006).
Nor is the Second Amendment "naturally divided into two parts," Heller v. United States,
554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008), no matter how much Justice Scalia's majority opinion manipulates
both its language and its history.
27 This well-known paraphrase is often invoked to summarize the thinking of Rabbi
Mordechai Kaplan, the founder of the Reconstructionism movement in Judaism, breifly
discussed in Aviam Soifer, The Spokesman Conundrum: "Is it Good for the Jews?," 40 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 1039, 1044 (2015).
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there are additional intimations from the constitutional text, as well as some
important insights to be drawn from history, underscoring this claim.
28
I do embrace Larry's point that the "equal" part of equal protection does not
mean that everyone ought to be treated equally.29 But I want to bring him along
(slowly) to worrying with me about the hopeful aspects, as well as the knotty
problems, if we were seriously to resuscitate the unrealized commitment to
"protection" in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. My ongoing argument is
that the texts, historical context, and aspirations of the Reconstruction
Amendments and civil rights statutes indicate-and even emphasize-
affirmative guarantees of federal rights extending beyond formal equality.
30
After all, as Larry summarized, "[t]he Constitution is not an exclusively
conservative constraining force, but primarily a positive empowering idea."
31
To be fair-as Larry is wont to say-the "rational instrumentalism" proposed
in Regulatory Rights is a helpful concept in itself, as is the book's learned and
critical discussion of other leading constitutional law scholars' work and judicial
decisions.. The four overlapping background assumptions around which Larry
organized Regulatory Rights, and which he claims are generally accepted, merit
28 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(explaining, even after the Rosenbergs had been executed: "To be writing an opinion in a case
affecting two lives after the curtain has been rung down upon them has the appearance of
pathetic futility. But history also has its claims").
Frankfurter concluded-notwithstanding his own generally crabbed view of federal
jurisdiction-with words that might appeal to a champion of broad federal habeas corpus
review:
Only by sturdy self-examination and self-criticism can the necessary habits for detached
and wise judgment be established and fortified so as to become effective when the
judicial process is again subjected to stress and strain.... Perfection may not be
demanded of law, but the capacity to counteract inevitable, though rare, frailties is the
mark of a civilized legal mechanism.
Id.
29 Larry sounded the theme that equal treatment does not mean identical treatment as early
as his student piece for the University of Kansas Law Review. See generally Larry Yackle,
Comment, The Indigent's Right to a Transcript of Record, 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 745 (1972).
Within a year, Larry joined his professor, Keith Meyer, in publishing a massive article and
handbook. See generally Keith G. Meyer & Larry W. Yackle, Collateral Challenges to
Criminal Convictions, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 259 (1973).
30 My argument focuses on the Thirteenth Amendment, and on the statutes based upon it,
as well as on the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Protecting Full
and Equal Rights: The Floor and More, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 196 (Alexander Tsesis ed.,
2010); Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten
Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607 (2012); Aviam Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979).
31 YACKLE, supra note 22, at 5.
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close attention.32 And though I go most of the way with Larry, I am afraid that
we two are still in quite a small minority in rejecting the tight hold of textualism
and originalism within constitutional law. We may have even less company in
emphasizing what should be an inescapable origin story: the crucial role of
government in establishing rights and the importance of government's vast
regulatory authority. And we share the isolated view that the constitutional
search for state action "is at best misleading and at worst naive.
'33
Though I am with Larry again, I think few others would embrace his succinct,
substantial point that: "For one thing, federalism (of any stripe) was never
inevitable in this country. The early states were only the product of the way this
part of the world was invaded.
'34
And Larry surely was overly optimistic when he expressed doubt that there
were still "fish left in those barrels [textualism and originalism] worth the
shooting.'35 Those big fish seem to be flopping around still, and making a big
splash at that.
Indeed, Larry's own meticulous digging into the context and lawyerly
strategies behind old chestnuts such as Ex parte Young36-who knew that
Young's famous "Noble Lie" had a start as a habeas corpus case?-and Smith v.
K. C. Title & Trust Co.,37 as well as the more recent yet now old chestnut, Fay v.
Noia,38 suggests that he may agree at least somewhat that contextual history and
lawyerly strategy do matter in influencing, as well as in understanding, judicial
decisions.
And a related cautionary note: as judges explore the connection of means and
ends in the course of Yackleian rational instrumentalism, there is probably
32 Id. at 8 ("I organize the materials around four overlapping themes: the rejection of
natural-rights theory, the concomitant recognition that government is largely responsible for
the measure of freedom that individuals enjoy, the acceptance of governmental power to
regulate private activities for the larger social good, and the abiding effort to distribute
authority between the Supreme Court and more politically accountable institutions."). See
also id. at 57, 125.
33 Yackle, supra note 7, at 575. This article's dialogue format, as well as its innovative
argument about First Amendment content regulation, is an early indicator of Larry's quiet yet
consistent boldness.
34 Larry Yackle, A Friendly Amendment, 95 B.U. L. REV. 641, 644 (2015).
35 YACKLE, supra note 22, at 7.
36 Larry Yackle, Young Again, 35 U. HAw. L. REV. 51 (2013) (describing, in what seems
to have been lawsuit created by the parties, that remedy sought echnically was to forestall
criminal prosecution).
37 Larry Yackle, Federal Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the Progressive Era: A Case
Study of Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co., 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 255, 301-10 (2013) (explaining
significance of federal right of action/cause of action in realm of federal common law
development prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
38 Yackle, supra note 15, at 191-93 (decrying Supreme Court's willingness to embrace
procedural default rules in name of federalism at expense of federal rights).
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something to be feared that is captured somewhat within an old cynical line, "if
the ends don't justify the means, what good are they?" Furthermore, as the
character played by Jean Renoir stated in The Rules of the Game-Renoir's great
film on the cusp of World War ll-"[t]he tragedy in life is that everyone has his
reasons."
39
As a final point, I feel obliged to mention one instance in which Larry is
definitely, blatantly, and entirely wrong. Recall what he said about his early days
at Leavenworth: "I became as hardened to the doors, the bars, and the rest of the
prison environment as the others who came that way-the inmates, the families,
the guards."40
Not so!
And we are much the better for it.
Would that we had even a few more people like Larry Yackle, willing and
very able to make "good trouble, necessary trouble"41 on behalf of those who
are among the most troubled in our midst. Long may Larry go on-giving us
hope as he challenges startling inequality, allegedly free markets and federalism,
purported efficiency, and additional false faiths. Larry Yackle tenaciously keeps
on pushing against basic unfairness in the law.
39 THE RULES OF THE GAME (John McGrath & Maureen Teitelbaum trans., 1970)
(containing script of 1939 film of same name).
For an earlier variation regarding this sobering psychological theme, see JAMES, supra note
3, at 86 ("There is no more common sight than that of men's mental worry about things
incongruous with personal desire, and their thoughtless incurious acceptance of whatever
happens to harmonise with their subjection ends.").
40 YACKLE, supra note 5, at 212.
41 Madina Toure, In New York, Civil Rights Icon John Lewis Urges People to Get into
'Necessary Trouble,' OBSERVER (June 13, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://observer.com/2017/06/
john-lewis-civil-rights-georgia-racism-trump-anne-frank/ [https://perma.cc/H6H8-3BYS]
(reporting Congressman John Lewis's message to audience upon his receipt of award from
Anne Frank Center for Mutual Respect).
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